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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty years, the duty to warn has received heavy emphasis
in litigationrelating to products liability.' In fact, "[f]ailure-to-warn claims are
now the most common form of litigated product case in the U.S."' Suggested
reasons for the proliferation of litigation in this area have included, inter alia,
the relative ease of initiating tort actions based upon inadequate warnings, the
difficulty in defending against such actions, and the apparently low cost of
placing warnings on products.' While the duty to warn would seem, on its
face, to be a fairly straightforward legal principle to apply, it has taken on a
new dynamic in the United States and in the European Union.4 Both the
United States and the European Union are composed of highly diverse
populations speaking a variety of languages. As these diverse populations
continue to grow, they become very attractive to manufacturers seeking new
markets for their products. These manufacturers, however, are not always
prepared to provide foreign speaking consumers with warning materials in
their native language. When a product injures someone the question inevitably
arises: Did the manufacturer have a duty to provide a warning to consumers
in their native language?
Products liability is a popular area of the law for comparative legal research
between American and European legal systems. This has occurred at least in
part due to the fact that products liability is a modem legal phenomenon and,
* J.D. 2001, The University of Georgia.
, Mark R. Lehto & James M. Miller, The Effectiveness of Warning Labels, in JOURNAL OF
PRODUCTS LIABELrrY 225 (Pergamon Press, 1988).
2 JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILrrY 252 (1994).
' See Lehto & Miller, supra note 1, at 225.
4 The European Union (EU) member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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systems have reacted to this new topic, in a relatively short time span.5 This
Recent Development will look specifically at the different ways in which the
United States and European Union legal systems address the issue of foreign
language product warnings and how their handling of that issue is reflective
of the fundamental differences in the two legal systems.
II. BACKGROUND
Products liability is an area of tort law that holds those who'provide
defective products or goods liable for various types of losses resulting from the
use of that product.6  This liability may extend to purchasers, users and
bystanders.7 Products are considered defective if they are manufactured in
such a manner as to be defective, designed in a defective manner, or if they
completely or inadequately fail to warn consumers about known risks. Under
the theories of products liability law, "a manufacturer can be held liable on the
basis of strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation or a market share theory of liability.'4
In addition to a manufacturer's duty not to negligently manufacture
defective products, the manufacturer also has a duty to warn purchasers about
any known dangers that might exist in its product. This includes a duty to give
adequate warnings. A manufacturer who fails to warn or whose warning is
inadequate regarding known risks or side effects associated with intended and
reasonably foreseeable uses of a product may be liable for negligence.9
Providing warnings about a product's potential dangers serves two primary
functions: promoting safe use and protecting consumers." Adequate warnings
reduce the risk of harm posed by the product by allowing consumers to act
more carefully in their use of the product. They also protect the ability of the
consumer to make informed choices as to whether to encounter certain risks."
' See Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability andProduct Safety:
Understandinga NecessaryElement in European Product Liability Through a Comparison with
the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 308 (2000).
6 See Linda M. Baldwin, Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.: Should Manufacturers of Nonprescrip-
tion Drugs Have a Duty to Warn in Spanish?, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 837, 840 (1995).
7 See W. PAGEKEETON ET AL., PROSSERAND KEETONoN THE LAW OF TORTS § 95,677 (5th
ed. 1984).
8 Baldwin, supra note 6, at 840.
9 Id. at 844-45.
10 See Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp. 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)
(holding that an equipment manufacturer had the duty to warn about foreseeable misuse; without
such information, the warning was inadequate).
" See Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1152 (1984); KEETON ET AL., supra note
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The cases demonstrate that product manufacturers may be held liable for
failing to warn of product dangers or for providing inadequate warnings under
theories of both negligence and strict liability.
III. NEGLIGENCE
The general rule regarding a manufacturer's duty to warn consumers of
product dangers under the negligence theory is embodied in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 388:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the
supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of
the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical
harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which
and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a)
knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to
be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has
no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to
exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous. 1'2
All three of the criteria set forth in section 388 must be satisfied for liability
to attach. A manufacturer must provide a warning of product risks when it
knows, or should know, that a product, without warnings, is likely to be
dangerous when used for the intended use. The duty to warn is also triggered
when the danger, absent any type of warning, would be considered either
"significant" or "sufficiently serious." Of all the parties in the distribution
chain of a product only the manufacturer is charged with the "knows or should
know" standard. The fact that the manufacturer is held to a higher standard is
based on the fact that it is presumed to have superior knowledge of the product
and its potential hazards.13
7, § 96, at 685.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
13 See Douglas 1R. Richmond, When Plain English Isn 't: Manufacturers' Duty to Warn in
a Second Language, 29 TORT & INS. LJ. 588 (1994).
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When a claim is based on negligence, the duty to warn hinges on whether
the injury at issue was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
Foreseeability takes on an important role in two contexts. The first question
is, was the product use foreseeable? In other words, was the product used as
the manufacturer might reasonably have expected? The second question is
was the injury itself foreseeable? Typically this is considered a question of
fact that is left to the jury to decide."'
IV. STRICT LIABILITY-A NEW STANDARD?-RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In May 1997, the question of establishing liability in a products liability
case took on yet another twist. At its annual meeting the American Law
Institute adopted, without a single dissenting vote, the new Restatement of the
Law (Third), Torts: Product Liability (Restatement (3d)). It was a project that
had consumed nearly six years and produced twelve drafts. 5
The new Restatement(3d) replaces Section 402A of the Rest atement(2d)
and seeks to clarify some of the ambiguities of Restatement(2d) by providing
separate definitions and standards for liability on the basis of manufacturing,
design and warning defects. Another important aspect of Restatement(3d) that
distinguishes it from its predecessor is the fact that it covers a number of issues
not previously covered. These include: evidence of compliance with safety
regulations, post-sales duties, successor liability, disclaimers and apportion-
ment of fault.
Section 1 of Restatement(3d) sets out the basic liability rule: "One engaged
in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.""'
This section serves to set forth in very simple terms the elements a plaintiff
will need to set forth in order to establish a prima facie case in a products
liability cause of action. The plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant was in the
business of selling or distributing the product that injured the plaintiff; (2) that
product was defective; and (3) that product defect caused personal injury or
property damage.17
14 Id.
'" See Michael A. Pope & Michael A. Glackin, Khat Every Products Seller Should Know
About the Restatement (Third) of Torts (visited Aug. 20, 1999) <http://www.mwe.com/news/
pinI 297.htn>.
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
'" See Pope & Glackin, supra note 15.
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Section 2 is the "real character" of the new Restatement(3d). " This section
recognizes three theories of defect and creates a functional approach to each.
Section 2 states: "[A product] is defective when, at the time of sale or
distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings." 19 In the past most
states have recognized these same three ways in which a product may be
defective. Section 402A, however, did not recognize the distinction since it
employed a single liability test for all three.2°
Following this new approach to establishing a definition of "defective,"
Section 2 then goes on to set forth precisely how each of the three categories
of defect must be established. In adopting this method of distinguishing three
separate categories Restatement (3d) "seems to reserve true strict liability for
manufacturing defects and to place recovery for design and failure to warn
defects on a negligence footing."'
Section 2(c) addresses warning defects specifically. It states:
[A product] is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision
of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product
not reasonably safe.'
While this new guideline would appear on the surface to be helpful in either
establishing or refuting the existence of liability based on product warnings,
one quickly realizes the continuing difficulty of getting your hands around
terms such as "reduced" and "reasonable." Through a careful reading of the
comments that follow Section 2(c) it becomes apparent that the Reporter
acknowledges the fact that the reasonableness standard is more difficult to
apply in the context of warning and instructions than it is in the area of design
defects. The comments explain that too many warnings or warnings that are
too detailed may in fact have the reverse of the desired effect and may actually
be ignored by the consumer. This makes determining the optimal intensity of
"8 See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective
Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REv. 985, 1021 (1998).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
2 See Pope & Glacken, supra note 15.
21 Howells & Mildred, supra note 18, at 1022.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
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warnings seem to be nothing more than an exercise in futility.2 3 The
comments do provide some guidance however, by setting out several factors
that courts should focus on in evaluating warnings or instructions. These
include: the gravity and risk posed by the product; the content and comprehen-
sibility of the warning; the intensity of expression; and characteristics of and
knowledge of foreseeable users. This is for all intents and purposes a
negligence analysis.'
It is the last factor that provides the most guidance in the context of this
examination of the duty owed to persons who speak a foreign language. If
courts are indeed going to take the characteristics of and knowledge of
foreseeable users into account in determining if a product is defective by
reason of the seller or distributor having supplied inadequate warnings or
instructions, then it should stand to reason that one of the "characteristics" the
court would consider would be the plaintiff s ability to read and understand the
language in which the instructions or warnings are provided.
The Restatement(3d) goes on to make it clear that a seller has no duty to
warn or instruct about risks that should be obvious or are generally known by
foreseeable products users.' The rationale behind this rule is that warnings of
this nature may actually serve to diminish the significance of other warnings
about non-obvious risks, as opposed to serving to enhance the overall safety
of the product. In addition, when a particular consumer would use a product
regardless of a warning or instruction, the fact that the warnings or instructions
are deemed to be inadequate is not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.26
The relevant time frame for assessing the adequacy of the product's
warning is at the time of sale or distribution. Therefore, if the warnings that
accompany a product serve to conspicuously set out the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product as known at the time of manufacture or distribution,
the warning will be deemed to be legally adequate. The fact that risks
associated with the product's use are later discovered does not in and of itself
render the warnings inadequate. 7
See Pope & Glacken, supra note 15.
24 See RESTATEmENT (TMHD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LiABiLrry § 2 cnt. e (1998).
25 See id.
2' See Pope & Glackin, supra note 15.
27 Id.
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V. IS THE WARNING ADEQUATE?
The Restatement (2d) does not provide much effective guidance to courts
and legislatures as to what a warning should say or exactly how a warning
should be stated. As a result, legislatures and courts are left to fend for
themselves when determining requirements for adequate warning. Their
response to this dilemma has been to rely heavily on adequacy." In order to
be considered adequate, a warning must identify the scope of the attendant
danger as well as the seriousness of the harm that could result from any
foreseeable misuse of the product.29 An adequate warning should allow
consumers to make informed choices about the risks they could suffer from the
use of a product.30 A company effectively warns society of the product's
dangers by prominently and clearly communicating the pertinent risks.3'
Finally, an adequate warning serves to protect each buyer's safety by
emphasizing the product's dangers to that buyer. 2
This final requirement forms the foundation of the adequacy test.3 The
typeface, color of the print or choice of the language make no difference if
consumers are not able to grasp the warning's meaning.' They are still unable
to make an informed analysis of the risks they might encounter if they chose
to use the product.35
VI. THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Beginning in the 1960's and continuing until just recently it was increas-
ingly apparent that the traditional legal principles found in European legal
systems were inadequate to deal with the modem phenomenon of products
liability.36 Prior to the adoption of the European Product Liability Directive
in 1985 products liability law was, for the most part undeveloped in the
n See Thomas H. Lee, A Purposeful Approach to Products Liability Warnings and Non-
English Speaking Consumers, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1115-16 (1994).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See Lee, supra note 28, at 1115-16.
33 See id.
3 See id.
31 See id. at 1117.
3 See Howells & Mildred, supra note 18, at 992.
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European Union. This is not to say, however, that injured parties were without
recourse.
37
Most of the member countries had a well-developed system of negligence
law that provided a basis for recovery, but this didn't afford all of the
advantages offered by strict liability. France had even gone as far as to
develop a system of liability without fault, approximating strict liability, to
deal with products. 38 In addition to this, several of the member states, prior to
the enactment of the directive, had shifted the burden of proof on liability from
plaintiffs to defendants in negligence actions in an effort to ease plaintiff's
recovery in product cases.39 Only in 1985, with the adoption of the European
product liability directive,' did strict products liability become a true part of
the European legal scene. Until then, English law had remained true to its
traditional legal principles. 41 As a result, contract remedies, although capable
of covering consequential loss resulting from personal injury, were only
available with parties to the contract,42 and fault was the basis of tort liability.43
Various reports had favored introducing strict liability," but there had been no
political impetus for reform.
The situation changed when children were bom with horrendous injuries
to mothers who had ingested thalidomide (Contergan). It was this thalidomide
scandal that gave the reform effort the impetus and the public support it
needed to react. As a result, Germany created a special liability regime for
medicine in 1976.41 The Council of Europe adopted the Strasbourg Conven-
tion on Product Liability in regard to Personal Injury and Death in 1976.
37 See Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union: Not a United States
Analog, 5 ROGER WILIAMS U. L. REV. 341, 347 (2000).
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 Council Directive 85/374, 1988 O.J. (L 307) 54.
41 See GERIANT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABLTY (1993).
42 See Daniels & Daniels v. White & Sons, Ltd., 4 All E.R. 258, (K.B. 1938) (holding that
plaintiff had no cause of action against a manufacturer because there had been adequate
supervision of workmen, although there was a cause of action against a retailer on a descriptive
sale theory).
43 See Hill v. James Crowe (Cases), Ltd., 1 All ER. 812 (Q.B. 1978). De facto strict liability
was applied to manufacturing defects and very high standards were demanded for inherently
dangerous products.
44 See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Liability for Defective
Products, 1977, Cmnd. 6831; Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for
Personal Injury, 1978, Cmnd. 7054-I.
4S See Howells & Mildred, supra note 18, at 992.
European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, Jan.
27, 1977, 1977 Europa T.S. No. 91.
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Two weeks prior to the Strasbourg Convention being finalized a draft
Directive was promulgated.47
The basic idea of the Directive was to introduce the strict liability doctrine
for defective products into the court systems of the fifteen members states of
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), as well as into the differing
domestic remedies already existing in those member states.4 Plaintiffs would
have to prove the "defect," the damage suffered, and the causal link between
the damage and the defect, but plaintiffs would not have to show that the
product was "defective" at the time the product left the defendant's hands.
The Directive also disregarded the "state of the art" defense and coverage was
expanded to personal injury, death, and property damages.49
Although introduced in 1976, the Directive was not adopted until July 17,
1985, nearly nine years after it was first promulgated. The long delay in
adoption may best be explained by Europe's inclination to look to the west
with respect to products liability laws. European industrialists were able to use
the headlines generated in American products liability cases to make their own
politicians nervous about enacting strict products liability legislation.
Most commentators agree that the events occurring on the American
products liability scene were due to factors other than the substantive law. The
outcomes in these cases were the result ofjury trials, widely available punitive
damages, the need for awards to cover the whole cost of injuries (including
health costs), and inflation of awards to compensate for the known deduction
of contingency fees. These features were not present in the European legal
arena, where judges decide both issues of liability and damages, and where
punitive damages are either not allowed or are available only in closely
prescribed circumstances and for relatively modest amounts. It is also
important to note that in Europe, health and social security systems offset a
large amount of the cost of injuries. Also, contingency fees are not known in
Europe, at least not known in the same form as we know them in America. 0
Implementation of the Directive was mandatory for all member states. The
member states were, according to Article Nineteen, required to implement the
provisions of the Directive in their national legislation by July 30, 1988. The
United Kingdom, Greece and Italy were the only countries to implement the
Directive prior to this deadline.5 A number of other countries passed statutes
47 See WARREN FREEDMAN, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 277 (1986).
41 See MICHAEL R. WILL, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN EUROPEAN COMMuNITY 28, 30
(Peter E. Herzog, ed., University Press of Virginia 1983).
49 Freedman, supra note 47, at 277.
'o See Howells & Mildred, supra note 18, at 993.
"' Seeid. at 1015.
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that the European Commission deemed to be nonconforming, and prior to
1998, only eight52 of the fifteen member nations had adopted a measure
implementing the products liability directive.53 Today all fifteen of the E.U.
member states have adopted the Directive. France was the last to adopt the
Directive in May of 1998.
The EC Products Liability Directive requires a person bringing a claim
against a manufacturer for injuries arising from an alleged product defect "to
prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and
damage."' The EC Directive effectively adopts a consumer expectation
standard for defectiveness. Article 6 of the Directive provides the following
standard for a defective product:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circum-
stances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b)the use to which it could reasonably be expected that
the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
4. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole
reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation."5
The issue of warnings is most clearly addressed in Article 6(1)(a) of the
Directive, which refers to the "presentation of the product." 6 This term,
however, can be broadly interpreted. Clearly, it would cover the container or
packaging that comes with the product and any literature on them, the product
itself or any accompanying literature. It would also cover the manner in which
the product is displayed or arranged. 7 The phrase would also seem to be
sI These nations are Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the United Kingdom. See Anita Bernstein, A Duty to Warn: One American View
of the EC Products Liability Directive, 20 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV. 224, 225 n.7 (1990).
" See id.
54 EC Directive, supra note 40, at art. 4.
ss Id. at art. 6. The consumer expectation test articulated in the EC Directive is similar to
the test applied by some courts in the United States. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A cmt. I (stating that a product is defective if "[t]he article sold [is] dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics").
EC Directive, supra note 40, at art. 6.
s7 See HOWELLS, supra note 41, at 37.
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broad enough to encompass promotional material from the manufacturer,
distributor or retailer and any advertisements for the product."8 The products'
presentation can serve to either raise or lower the consumer safety expecta-
tions.59 Typically, advertising and marketing practices will serve to raise
expectations about the product in question by stressing its advantages and
generally promoting consumer confidence in it. Expectations, however, can
also be lowered through these practices by suggesting that certain designs are
standard. This creates the perception that special safety features are only
found on deluxe models.'
There will also be an increase in the amount of information provided, with
producers trying to avoid liability by drawing all the potential risks to the
consumer's attention in the accompanying information.6' As an example,
drugs will come with package inserts describing any possible contra-
indications. Detailed instructions relating to the use of the product will be
given and liability will be denied if the user transgresses from these rules in
any way.62 There is a real danger that consumers will be faced with an
information overload.63
It is, however, impracticable for a consumer to be warned of every possible
danger of a particular product. For example, should a manufacturer of
microwave ovens be required to warn purchasers that they should not dry their
dogs in them?6 Fortunately, the Directive requires that, in deciding the
defectiveness of a product, the reasonably expected use to which the product
will be put is to be taken into consideration.65 Without this caveat, it is
possible that producers might subject product users to ever-longer lists of
instructions and warnings in an attempt to avoid liability."6 This action could
prove to be counterproductive to consumer safety because consumers might
be less likely to read longer and more intricate warnings.67
$a See id.
'9 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
6' See id. at 37-3 8.
64 See Simon Whittaker, The EECDirective on Product Liability, 5 Y.B. OFEUR. L. 233,243
(1985).
65 See id.
66 See id. at 244.
67 See id.
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VII. U.S. PERSPECTIVE
In the United States it is becoming increasingly frequent that foreseeable
users are persons for whom English is a second language." In recent years
millions of immigrants, both legal and illegal, have come to the United States.
They come looking for work and in search of a new life in a free society. Most
of these immigrants come from Latin America and Asia, and they often form
insular communities where they continue to speak their native language and
practice their native customs. 69 According to the 1990 Census more than
thirty-one million Americans do not speak English at home." If all the
Americans who speak Spanish at home lived in a single state, then it would
form the third most populous state in the nation." Statistics help to explain
why non-English newspapers, television stations and radio stations comprise
a rapidly growing market for readers and advertisers. 2
A. Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman
One of the earliest cases to address the issue of foreign language warnings
in the United States was Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman. 3 In this
case an insecticide manufacturer sold bags of a product called Parathion to a
farmer.' The bag's warning label was printed in English only, and it
contained no symbols or picture type warnings. After working with the
product all day long two farm workers became violently ill and died.' Both
of these workers were Puerto Ricans, one of whom was able to read only a
limited amount of English.' 6
The administrators of the two decedents' estates sued the manufacturer for
negligently failing to warn the two men of the dangers associated with the use
of Parathion." The jury found that the defendant/manufacturer did not
" See Richmond, supra note 13, at 589.
6 See Jonathan Michael Purver, Manufacturer's or Seller's LiabilityforFailure to Provide
Foreign Language or Symbolic Product Warning or Instruction, 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
3d 239, 245 (1995).
70 Thomas H. Lee, A PurposefulApproach to ProductsLiability Warnings and Non-English
Speaking Consumers, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1994).
71 See id.
7 See id.
73 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965).
74 See id. at 403.
75 See id. at 404.
76 See id. at 403.
" See id. at 404.
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exercise reasonable care in giving the workers adequate warning of the
dangerous nature of the product and proper instructions for its use."' The
judgement was affirmed on appeal.
In response to situations such as this, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has adopted a mandatory approach for the labeling of toxic
pesticides. The EPA has identified four levels of toxicity. For categories I and
H, which are the highest level, the rule requires that the "signal word" be in
Spanish.79 A signal word is that word contained in the warning or instructions
that is intended to catch the user's attention." This would include such words
as: 'Danger,' 'Warning,' 'Poison' or 'Caution.' s1 The label is also required to
contain a statement in Spanish instructing anyone who does not understand the
label to find someone to explain it in full detail. This rule serves to assure that
the consumer is aware of the need to understand the label, but it does not go
so far as to require the manufacturer to provide a full translation of the label."2
B. Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
It would be almost 20 years before another court would have the opportu-
nity to consider the court's rationale in Hubbard-Hall. That chance came
when the New Jersey Supreme Court heard Campos v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company." Armondos Campos was Portuguese by birth.8 He worked
for a truck-trailer manufacturer assembling tires. This process is so dangerous
that the work is performed inside a cage to protect workers if the tire rim
explodes under pressure.8" Firestone, the manufacturer of the rim, was aware
of the fact that this could occur, and as a result had provided Campos'
employer with a sign to warn of this occurrence. However, Campos was
unable to read either English or Portuguese."' Campos reached into the cage
to lock the rim shut and, when he did, the rim exploded, severely injuring him.
7 See id. at 404.
" See R. Geoffrey Dillard, Multilingual Warning Labels: Product Liability, "Official
English, " and Consumer Safety, 29 GA. L. REV. 197, 202 (1994).
'0 See id.
S" See id. at 202 n.24.
82 See id. at 203.
98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984)See id. at 307.
85 See id.
" See id.
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Campos sued Firestone under New Jersey's strict products liability law and a
jury awarded him damages in the amount of $225,000.7
Firestone appealed the verdict and the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
Firestone did in fact have a duty to warn those persons whose job it was to
assemble tire rims.8 The court held that it was foreseeable that a number of
the persons who would be doing this type of work would be unskilled or semi-
skilled workers who cannot read English. The warning Firestone provided was
therefore inadequate. 9 This case suggests that, in similar circumstances,
manufacturers should give warnings of this nature in the form of symbols. 90
C. Stanley Industries, Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., Inc.
Eight years later, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
was presented with an opportunity to weigh in on this issue. That opportunity
presented itself in the form of Stanley Industries Inc. v. W.M Barr & Co. Inc.91
The case involved two brothers from Nicaragua who spoke primarily Spanish.
They worked for the plaintiff corporation and in their job were using linseed
oil, manufactured by the defendant corporation and sold by Home Depot, to
oil a cutting table. After finishing their task, they stored their oil soaked rags
in a manner contrary to the instructions on the product label. Stanley alleged
that this led to the spontaneous combustion of the rags, which resulted in a fire
that damaged its plant.9" The English-only label included instructions and
directions for the use of linseed oil. The label contained no graphics, symbols
or pictographs to alert users of the product's potentially dangerous properties.93
Both men testified that, if the label had contained warnings in Spanish
concerning the flammability of the product, they would have sought more
information relating to its proper use." Prior to the fire, the defendant
manufacturer and Home Depot had engaged in a cooperative advertising
program to promote various products, including the linseed oil, in the Miami
market and particularly in the Hispanic community there.95
17 See id. at 203.
"S See Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198.
89 See id. at 208.
" See Lee, supra note 70, at 1125.
9' 784 F. Supp. 1570 (1992).
9 See id. at 1572.
93 See id.
9 See id. at 1573.
9' See id.
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Stanley sued the manufacturer and the retailer under theories of negligent
failure to warn, strict liability and breach of warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose claiming that the defendants failed to adequately and fairly warn the
users of the linseed oil's dangerous propensities."
The court found that, as in Hubbard-Hall,97 in light of the advertising in
Hispanic markets and the nature of the product, a jury should decide whether
the manufacturer should have foreseen that its product would be used by non-
English speaking persons.98 Secondly, the court concluded, using the rational
of Campos, that this foresight made the English-only warnings inadequate."
Stanley Industries, therefore, established a new rule of law: When a product
manufacturer uses non-English language media to reach non-English speaking
consumers, the manufacturer cannot insist that English only product warnings
are sufficient as a matter of law. Of course this rule is not as strong as a
finding that English-only warnings are inadequate as a matter of law when the
manufacturer targets non-English speaking consumers."°
D. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.
Perhaps surprisingly, in light of the court's decision in Stanley, this has not
been a very heavily litigated area of the law. However, while there may not
have been a great quantity of courts to consider this issue many would argue
that there has certainly been quality. The most recent case on point is Ramirez
v. Plough, Inc."'0 This case was decided almost two years'after Stanley by the
California Supreme Court, the same court that gave us Escola and Greenman.
Ramirez involved a minor plaintiff, Jorge Ramirez, who, when he was four
months old, was given three St. Joseph Aspirin for Children by his mother. St.
Joseph Aspirin for Children is manufactured and distributed by the defendant
Plough, Inc. The product label carried a warning that stated that the aspirin
should only be given to children under two years old "as directed by doctor.' ' 2
However, the plaintiff's mother did not consult a doctor prior to giving her
child the aspirin. Jorge later contracted Reye's syndrome and as a result
% Id.
97 340 F.2d 402 (1965).
" See id. at 1576.
99 See id.
'00 See Lee, supra note 70, at 1127.
10 863 P.2d 167 (1993).
'02 See id. at 169.
2001]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
suffered "severe neurological damage, including cortical blindness, spastic
quadriplegia and mental retardation."' 3
Saint Joseph Aspirin for Children packages and package inserts displayed
a warning to alert consumers of the dangers of Reye's syndrome. These
warnings on the packaging and inserts were written only in English. Ms.
Ramirez was born in Mexico and was only literate in Spanish."°  The
defendant had advertised the product in the Hispanic community in both
English and Spanish.0" Plaintiffbrought suit against the defendant through his
mother who was acting as guardian ad litem. The causes of action were fraud,
negligence and product liability and all were based upon the theory of
defendant's alleged failure to warn about the dangers of Reye's syndrome."°
Plough moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was under no duty to
label the aspirin with Spanish language warnings, that the English warnings
were adequate.
10 7
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that there was no duty to warn in a foreign language, and there was no
causal relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's actions.
The plaintiff appealed."°
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order.'0 Plough's
own evidence showed that over 148 foreign languages are spoken in the United
States and more than 23,000,000 Americans speak a language other than
English in their home. "0 The plaintiff submitted evidence to show that Plough
knew that Hispanics were an important segment of the children's aspirin
market and that they often maintain their first language rather than learn
English. Relying on this fact, the court held that "the foreseeability of
purchase by a Hispanic not literate in English and the reasonableness of not
giving a Spanish language warning" were issues for the jury to decide."'
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of California which
reversed the lower court. The supreme court began its analysis of the case by
addressing the appropriate standard of care. The court noted that in a tort
103 See id.
104 Id.
'0' See Rarnirez, 863 P.2d at 170.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
'0 See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423,430 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 863 P.2d
167 (Cal. 1993).
110 See id.
... Id. at 430.
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liability case the usual standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent person
under like circumstances. However there are instances where the proper
conduct of a reasonable person can be prescribed by statute or ordinance." 2
Because the FDA comprehensively regulates nonprescription drug labeling
and because their regulations specify not only the subject of warnings, but also
the actual language to be used, the court held that "the prudent course is to
adopt for tort purposes the existing legislative and administrative standard of
care.""..3  The court deferred to these bodies because of "their superior
technical and procedural lawmaking resources."" 4
The court reasoned that since both the California Legislature and the U.S.
Congress required Spanish warnings in certain specified circumstances, it
could be inferred that their silence with regard to nonprescription drugs
indicated a deliberate intent to exclude drug manufacturers from a duty to warn
in a foreign language." 5
After all was said and done, the court recognized that if a Spanish language
warning had been included with the aspirin, and if Ms. Ramirez had read and
heeded the warning, the tragedy that befell little Jorge might have been
avoided. Still the court held that "manufacturers ofnonprescription drugs have
no presently existing legal duty, within the tort law system, to include foreign-
language warnings in their packaging materials."
' 16
VIII. EU CASE ANALYSIS: THE BELGIAN
DEPARTMENT STORE BATTLE
Though the European Union community has not had a case directly on
point with this issue, a recent dispute between two Belgian department stores
may provide an excellent insight into how the European community views the
matter.
In Colim NV v. Bigg 's Continent Noord NV,"7 the Court of Justice of the
European Communities addressed the issue of whether member states could
require imported products to carry certain label information in the language of
the area in which the products are sold or in a language that is readily
understood by the consumer."8
112 Ranirez, 863 P.2d at 171.
See id. at 176.
"14 Id. at 177.
' See id. at 175.
116 Id. at 178.
"1 Case C-33/97, 1999 ECR 1-3175, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 135 (1999).
". See id. at 141.
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Belgium had adopted a national law requiring that certain product label
information"9 be given in the language or languages of the area in which the
products were placed on the market.'2 Colim charged that Bigg's was selling
products in its store, including food, cosmetics, detergent and pet food, that
was not labeled in Dutch, the language of the area.' Bigg's then counter-
claimed, alleging that Colim was also selling goods that were not properly
labeled in Dutch. Bigg's also raised the defense that the Belgian national law
requiring labeling in other languages was invalid because this constituted a
"technical regulation," and as such should have gone through a review process
by the E.C. Commission prior to adoption.
2 2
The court held that the national legislation at issue was not a "technical
issue" and was not therefore invalid. " The court went on to find that member
states may adopt national laws requiring that labeling information appearing
on imported products be given in the language of the area in which the
products are sold or in another language which is easily understood by the
consumers in that area. The court limited its holding to some degree by
including the proviso that any national laws that are adopted by member states
putting in place requirements of this nature must "apply without distinction to
all national and imported products and are proportionate to the objective of
consumer protection which they pursue. They must, in particular, be restricted
to information which the Member State makes mandatory and which cannot
be appropriately conveyed to consumers by other than translation."124
IX. LEGAL ANALYSIS
But what about the tort law system of the European Union or the United
States tort law system as it currently exists following the adoption by the ALI
of Restatement(3d)? Does a manufacturer still not have a duty to include
foreign-language warnings in their packaging materials or has a new day
dawned for the Jorge Ramirezes of the world?
By applying the EC Directive to the facts in Ramirez, one easy answer
would be to say that certainly the language of Article 6125 would lead to the
" Instructions for use and guarantee certificates.
120 Case C-33/97, supra note 117, at 135.
"2 See id. at 140.
12 See id.
123 See id. at 165.
124 Id. at 166.
" See Directive, supra note 40. Article 6 states: "(1) A product is defective when it does
not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account,
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conclusion that a person is entitled to expect to be able to read the warnings on
a product that is actively marketed in his or her community. This rationale
would lead to the conclusion that a court applying the EC Directive to these
facts would have found that the defendant manufacturer had marketed a
defective product and was therefore liable to the plaintiff.
Before we allow ourselves to go too far down that path, however, it is
imperative to the fact that the Directive, as it was adopted, takes the form of
an extension, or a supplement, to the individual Member States' product
liability rules. The Member States' preexisting rules remain in force without
change. 26 This means that we must look beyond the Directive itself and also
consider any preexisting rules or case law in the particular Member State at
issue. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is a wealth of case law
dealing with the issue of the duty to warn that must be considered.'27
It is in considering this point that the Court of Justice of the European
Communities decision in Colim becomes important. While the case does not
establish a duty to warn, if a Member State has adopted its own legislation
requiring labeling information in the language or languages of the area where
the product is being marketed then that law is going to be upheld. This would
certainly seem to open the door to a potential negligence per se argument if the
requirement of the legislation is not met and a person is harmed as a result.
Another factor to take into consideration is the fact that the EC Directives
provide a number of specific defenses. One that might be particularly
applicable to the facts in Ramirez is set out as follows: "the defect is due to
compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by the public
authorities."'" This would take us back to the regulations of the state and the
federal government that the California court relied on to establish the standard
of care. The defense makes clear the fact that it applies only to mandatory
including (a) the presentation of the product. .... "
"2 See Michael Christiani Havemann, The EC Directive on Product Liability: Its
Background, Aims and System, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE AND PROCESS
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 17, 18 (Rudolph Hulsenbek & Dennis Campbell eds.,
1989).
127 See generally Farr v. Butter Bros., (1932) 2 KB 606 (holding no liability for failure to
warn of a defect in a crane because the deceased continued to work despite knowing that the
crane was defective); British Chartered Co. of South Africa v. Lennon Ltd., 31 TLR 585 (1915)
(holding that a warning that is positively misleading can be the basis of liability); Holmes v.
Ashford, 2 All ER 76 (1950) (holding that a warning on the literature that accompanies the
product may be appropriate and it is often sufficient for the warning to be given to an
intermediary). A manufacturer does not have to warn the ultimate recipient of a product if it
provides sufficient warning to an intemediary.
'25 See Directive, supra note 40, at art. 7(d).
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regulations, so a manufacturer would not be able to rely on compliance with
a voluntary Code of Practice or any non-regulatory standard. 2 9 In the Ramirez
case, the regulations that the defendant put forth in its defense were mandatory
regulations so it would seem that this defense would be available in the EU.
30
However, the defense is more narrowly drawn than might be apparent from a
cursory reading of the text. The defense is not available simply because the
product complies with the mandatory regulations.13 ' The defect must be due
to compliance with the regulations. Therefore, the defense would not be
available if the product could have been made in a non-defective manner while
still complying with the regulations. 32  The state and federal labeling
regulations that Plough relied upon did not state that the warning could only
be provided in English. Therefore, it would have been possible for the
manufacturer to have provided a Spanish warning in addition to the English
warning. This would have allowed the product to be made in a non-defective
manner while still conforming to the regulations, therefore eliminating this
defense.
It is impossible to say for sure whether the EC Directives would result in
a different outcome in the Ramirez case, but it is certain that the products
Directive and other consumer measures still appear attractive to the Member
States. The adoption of measures such as this allow governments to appear
active in fields such as a consumer protection and to appear to establish
substantially greater protection than before, even when this is not the case.
This is especially true considering the fact that local regimes survive
untarnished.' Any reform brought about by the Directive becomes more of
a fagade when the European Court of Justice is persuaded for legal or political
reasons to see issues such as defectiveness, causation and remoteness as ones
of fact to be decided at the local level.'3
Would the application of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
to the facts in Ramirez result in a different outcome? As has previously been
pointed out, liability for a defective warning under Restatement (3d) hinges on
"the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings."' 35 One of the factors
set out in the comments to Section 2(c) for courts to consider in evaluating
129 See HOWELLS, supra note 41, at 42.
13o Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 167.
'3 HOWELLS, supra note 41, at 42.
132 See id.
'" See Stapleton, supra note 2, at 355.
134 See id.
131 RESTATEMENT (TID) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
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warnings and instructions is "the characteristics of and knowledge of
foreseeable users.
''136
The facts in Ramirez would seem to support the conclusion that it was
foreseeable to Plough that members of the Hispanic community would be
users of its St. Joseph Aspirin for Children. The foreseeability is compounded
by the fact that they were actively marketing the product in the Hispanic
community through the use of Hispanic media sources. If we accept the fact
that members of the Hispanic community of Los Angeles were foreseeable
users, then our analysis shifts to a focus of their characteristics and knowledge.
What are the characteristics and knowledge of the Hispanic community of Los
Angeles? Should Plough have known that there are members of this
community that cannot read English? Does not the fact that they placed ads
in Spanish indicate that they had this knowledge? Does that knowledge, in and
of itself translate into a duty on Plough to place warnings in Spanish on its
product?
The fact that Plough used English only warnings may not be the proximate
cause of Jorge Ramirez's injuries. Maybe not. Restatement (3d) makes it
clear that a seller has no duty to warn or instruct about risks that should be
obvious or are generally known by foreseeable product users. Therefore, when
a particular consumer would use a product regardless of a warning or
instruction, the lack of adequate warnings or instructions is not the legal cause
of the plaintiff's injury. 37 If this is a negligence analysis, as has been
suggested by some, 38 then without proximate cause there is no cause of action
because one of the elements is missing.
39
Just as we saw in attempting to apply the standards of the EC Directive to
the facts of Ramirez, an attempt to apply Restatement (3d) raises more
questions than it answers. However, "while both the EC Directive and the
Third Restatement have adopted different defectiveness standards, both have
adopted a standard which is considered to be pro-defendant."'" In the
European Union the limitations inherent in a judge's strict application of the
consumer expectation standard are emphasized. Whereas in the United States,
"the Third Restatement's preference for risk-utility and a down playing of
consumer expectations reflects a desire to reduce the potential ofjury verdicts
136 Id.
317 See Pope & Glackin, supra note 15.
138 Id.
"9 See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 7, at 164.
"4 Howells & Mildred, supra note 18, at 1025.
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based on heightened assessments of safety expectations from jurors who are
swayed by images of suffering, injured plaintiffs., 141
X. A MANUFACTURER'S OPTIONS
So where does this leave a manufacturer in the Untied States or the
European Union who knows that his products are being purchased or used by
consumers who speak a foreign language? Persons in decisionmaking roles
with regards to the placement of warning labels should begin their assessment
from the premise that product warning labels should be designed to prevent
injuries, not just to absolve manufacturers of liability. Therefore, manufactur-
ers should construct warnings in a way that communicates clearly and
effectively with all the populations at risk.
42
With this in mind a number of potential solutions have been suggested.
These include: a case-by-case determination of when a manufacturer must give
warnings in a foreign language," 3 symbolic warnings,'" and a blanket foreign
warning requirement.14
5
None of these possible solutions are without their drawbacks. The
California Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case solution in Ramirez because
of the burden on manufacturers of including warnings in so many different
languages and the potential for a counterproductive effect.'" The use of
symbols raises more questions such as: when should they be used," 7 who
would develop these symbols, and would they be adopted internationally?
Finally, the option of a blanket foreign language warning requirement seems
to run the greatest risk of overkill and counterproductivity. A requirement of
this nature could easily result in manufacturers printing multilingual warning
labels that might intimidate or confuse consumers, causing them to ignore all
of the information, including that in their own language.
141 id.
142 See ChristopherS.Maciejewski, TheDilemma OverForeign-LanguageLabelingofOver-
the-Counter Drugs, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 129 (1994).
"e See Baldwin, supra note 6, at 872-73 (setting out a threshold inquiry under which the
consumer must show: "(I)he or she was a member of a foreseeable group of non-English-
speaking consumers that the defendant was specifically targeting; and (2)that the foreseeable
group comprised asignificantportion of the defendant's market and [the population of the state
in which the action was brought]." The proof of these two points would establish a rebuttable
presumption that language would be a factor that could be considered by the jury).
'44 See Maciejewski, supra note 142, at 150.
141 See id. at 151.
'46 See Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 175.
" See Maciejewski, supra note 142, at 150.
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X. CONCLUSION
There are no easy answers for manufacturers in the United States or the
European Union. However, they must remain mindful of the fact that Ramirez
is a very limited holding that applies only to manufacturers ofnonprescription
drugs. Any manufacturer that produces a product that is not subject to the
same stringent warning guidelines that are in place for nonprescription drugs
will find himself outside the protection of Ramirez or the EC Directive
defenses and in largely uncharted territory.
It seems clear that manufacturers should not have to provide blanket
warnings in every conceivable foreign language. However, for the manufac-
turer who specifically targets a population and actively markets to that group
through the use of advertising devices produced in that population's native
language, the bar must be raised. That manufacturer must accept some
responsibility for his deliberate actions and that includes accepting a duty to
provide warnings in that population's native language.
Our world is becoming smaller with each passing day. As we witness the
revolution of e-commerce and the advent of faster modes of transportation
people are gaining access to products that were never before available to them.
If we are going to insure that these new opportunities are positive experiences
as opposed to journeys into the dangerous unknown, then some mechanism
must be put in place to insure that manufacturers give those consumers that
they seek out all of the information they need to use products safely. A case-
by-case evaluation for manufacturers that seek out minority markets is the only
way to accomplish that.
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